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A contemporaneous rise in mortgage debt, securitization, and house prices occurred in 
the US in the bubble years of 2003-7 (Levitin	  and	  Wachter	  2012). A house price boom 
occurred in a number of European countries in these same years. Figure 1 points to 2007 as the 
approximate peak of the house price bubble 1 for the US, Spain, Ireland, the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. In Europe and the US, the house price boom was accompanied by an 
expansion of mortgage financing.  A rapid expansion of mortgage lending and mortgage 
securitization of various forms in Europe occurred in these years as well (IMF 2009). The timing 
of the house price cycle and the credit correlates of these economies mirror those of the US.  
Despite these similarities, a granular analysis points to substantial differences in 
mortgage funding among these economies. Most significantly, in Europe, mortgage debt 
remained an obligation of the banking system. In contrast, in the US, mortgage risk was 
offloaded to capital markets through a new “originate to distribute” model of lending. In Europe, 
the rapid expansion in mortgage debt during the bubble years was funded by bank-held 
obligations. While securitization was important in both the EU and the US, in Europe, 
securitization took a different form, with covered bonds being the primary mortgage 
securitization vehicle. Covered bonds are debt securities backed by cash flows from mortgages. 
Unlike mortgage backed securities (MBS), covered bond assets remain on the issuer’s 
consolidated balance sheet and remain an obligation of the originating bank lender.  They differ 
from MBS by being backed both by the collateral represented by the home and the bank’s 
contractual obligation to repay investors. MBS, similar to those used in the US, were deployed in 
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Europe as well, but the timing of the expansion of this form of mortgage debt was different.  
While MBS expanded early in the cycle in the US, this expansion occurred after the peak of the 
price cycle in Europe. 
The explanations offered in the literature for the boom and bust cycles in the EU 
countries and the US do not generally point to or consider what can be learned from this 
difference. Rather, commentaries typically focus on common global explanations for the housing 
bubble, such as low interest rates, a savings glut,2 and the inelastic supply of real estate.  A 
second strand of the literature focuses on financial innovation, the increased availability of 
mortgage credit and the simultaneous decline in underwriting standards.3  For example, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, whose purpose was the determination of the causes of the 
crisis, in its majority report, pointed to new forms of credit, regulatory and supervisory failure, 
with a minority report pointing to the global commonality of excessive leverage spread by new 
forms of securitization (FCIC 2011). Securitization has been identified as the source of the crisis 
in part due to misaligned incentives: bank originators of risky debt were not holders of that debt 
and thus could gain from the revenue generated by issuance of mortgages without incurring risk.  
Moreover, investors who purchased these securities, particularly “rate investors,” relied on 
ratings rather than analyzing the risk. Many commentators identify the complexity inherent in 
these new forms of securitization, such as CDOs and CDS, as a causal factor for enabling the 
debt and price boom.4 
Were “innovations” in securitization a common cause of the crisis of what was a global 
cycle? The European experience demonstrates that, to the contrary, the expansion of new forms 
of mortgage securitization was not a necessary feature of the house price boom.  The housing 
boom in the bubble countries in Europe, in its reliance on bank funding, was similar to the earlier 
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real estate boom/bust cycles in Japan in the early 1990s and in the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1996.  
In Europe, this bank-led funding variously took the form of agency bonds, covered bonds 
or mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives, as well as wholesale deposits. Increases in 
mortgage debt in these years were funded through covered bonds or wholesale deposits, at least 
initially. In Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark, the mortgage debt expansion that accompanied 
the house price boom was funded, to a large extent, through covered bonds.  In Ireland and the 
UK, short-term wholesale deposit funding was used as the major funding source.  MBS was part 
of the funding increase in these countries, but direct funding that remained on the banks’ books 
was a more significant source of funding.   
 For example, Ireland, which experienced the most extreme cycle, is emblematic of the 
bank-led expansion of credit. Irish banks achieved their supply targets through short-term 
wholesale funding. Securitization did play a role in Ireland’s crisis towards the back end of the 
bubble; however, short-term wholesale funding, made available through the country’s accession 
into the Eurozone, largely drove Ireland’s oversupply of credit. Securitization came into play 
post-Q2 2006, after the Irish housing market had already risen nearly 300% in the 10 years prior; 
the peak in the housing prices was to come only a year later in Q2 2007 (European Commission). 
The shift from portfolio lending to the “originate to distribute” model cited in the US as a 
major source of the crisis was not the main story in these European countries; rather, it was bank-
led expansion of leverage.  The	  off-­‐loading	  of	  risk	  through	  securitization	  in	  a	  presumed	  world	  of	  assignee	  liability	  where	  investors	  are	  also	  in	  the	  blind	  as	  to	  the	  risk	  they	  are	  taking	  on	  is	  not	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  a	  housing	  bubble	  (McCoy	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Thus,	  the	  European	  experience	  raises	  deeper	  questions	  about	  the	  root	  source	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  potential	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remedies.	  	  	  What	  is	  common	  in	  both	  Europe	  and	  the	  US	  and	  most	  severe	  financial	  crises	  is	  the	  role	  of	  housing	  and	  real	  estate.	  	  We	  argue	  elsewhere	  (Herring	  and	  Wachter	  1999)	  that	  the	  key	  factor	  in	  making	  real	  estate	  the	  asset	  class	  behind	  most	  severe	  financial	  crises	  is	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  this	  market	  and	  the	  difficulty	  in	  selling	  short	  real	  estate	  when	  its	  value	  departs	  from	  fundamentals,	  which	  allows	  optimists’	  pricing	  to	  prevail.	  	  Using	  collateralized	  lending,	  optimists	  can	  continue	  to	  bid	  up	  prices.,	  whether	  funded	  through	  MBS	  or	  bank	  held	  assets5.	  A	  separate	  literature	  on	  financial	  accelerators	  points	  to	  credit	  expansion	  and	  its	  feedback	  effect	  on	  increasing	  asset	  prices	  as	  the	  key	  to	  the	  role	  of	  debt	  in	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  housing	  asset-­‐based	  financial	  crises	  (Bernanke,	  Gertler,	  and	  Gilchrist	  1999).	  	  In	  this	  literature,	  it	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  in	  ratifying	  and	  propagating	  asset	  price	  rises	  through	  a	  bank-­‐led	  expansion	  of	  credit.	  	  The	  source	  of	  bank	  behavior	  has	  been	  variously	  ascribed	  to	  misaligned	  incentives,	  short-­‐termism,	  moral	  hazard,	  and	  information	  asymmetries	  (Pavlov	  and	  Wachter	  2006).	  	  The	  empirical	  literature	  focuses	  on	  whether	  bank	  lending	  Granger	  causes	  price	  rises,	  through	  easing	  of	  lending	  conditions	  as	  asset	  prices	  rise,	  or	  the	  reverse,	  with	  price	  rises	  causing	  lending	  expansion	  (Anundsen	  and	  Jansen	  2013).	  But	  even	  the	  simple	  use	  of	  current	  market	  house	  prices	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  collateral	  value,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  may	  depart	  systematically	  from	  fundamental	  value,	  will	  result	  in	  the	  same	  outcome	  of	  excess	  leverage	  in	  a	  bubble.	  	  Banks	  generally	  rely	  on	  appraisals	  that,	  in	  turn,	  rely	  on	  current	  market	  pricing	  and	  are	  often	  under	  regulatory	  obligation	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  result	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  a	  bank-­‐led	  expansion	  of	  credit,	  a	  persistent	  and	  growing	  departure	  of	  prices	  from	  their	  fundamental	  levels,	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  short	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selling	  to	  contain	  price	  rises.	  The	  European	  experience	  appears	  to	  validate	  this	  more	  general	  explanation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Optimists’	  pricing	  and	  “irrational	  exuberance”	  that	  occur	  with	  backward	  looking	  expectations	  are	  likely	  factors	  in	  prices	  departing	  from	  fundamentals;	  neither	  banks	  nor	  home	  buyers	  are	  asset	  pricers.	  	  Rather,	  banks	  and	  home	  buyers	  take	  market	  prices	  as	  given	  and	  assume	  they	  are	  accurate.	  6	  	  When	  prices	  are	  out	  of	  line,	  macro	  prudential	  policy	  to	  contain	  credit	  has	  recently	  been	  instituted	  in	  several	  countries,	  and	  in	  the	  US,	  stress	  tests	  that	  consider	  house	  price	  vulnerability	  are	  in	  place.	  	  But	  if	  banks	  are	  unable	  to	  go	  beyond	  current	  market	  pricing	  to	  determine	  whether	  prices	  are	  out	  of	  line	  with	  fundamentals,	  how	  will	  regulators	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  this?	  Beyond	  these	  new	  regulatory	  stances,	  are	  there	  market-­‐based	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  in	  the	  mispricing	  episodes?	  	  	  If	  the	  problem	  at	  base	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  financial	  derivatives	  or	  other	  market-­‐based	  instruments	  to	  sell	  short	  overpriced	  real	  estate,	  is	  there	  a	  potential	  role	  for	  derivatives	  to	  signal	  mispricing	  and	  weigh	  against	  the	  market?	  While	  the	  experience	  with	  Case/Shiller	  index	  futures	  (Shiller	  2012)	  may	  suggest	  this	  is	  an	  exercise	  in	  futility,	  the	  common	  fundamental	  of	  mispriced	  real	  estate	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  short	  sell	  instrument	  suggests	  that	  securitization	  could	  still	  be	  a	  solution	  and	  not	  only	  a	  source	  of	  market	  failure	  and	  bubbles.	  	  	  The	  key	  would	  be	  for	  such	  instruments’	  pricing	  to	  reflect	  the	  overall	  market,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  overall	  market	  that	  is	  potentially	  mispriced.	  While	  the	  long	  history	  suggests	  otherwise,	  in	  fact,	  new	  derivatives	  have	  been	  introduced	  to	  the	  US	  market	  recently7	  that	  do	  just	  this	  and	  which	  may	  in	  fact	  succeed	  in	  establishing	  a	  liquid	  market	  to	  trade	  overall	  mispricing	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risk.	  While	  the	  demand	  to	  trade	  individual	  market	  price	  risk	  has	  been	  thin,	  as	  might	  be	  expected	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  real	  estate	  ownership	  is	  a	  hedge	  against	  price	  rises,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  tradable	  asset	  to	  complete	  this	  market,	  particularly	  to	  price	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  credit	  default	  event	  as	  debt	  and	  prices	  expand.	  There	  is,	  at	  least	  conceptually,	  room	  for	  both	  market-­‐based	  and	  regulatory-­‐based	  solutions	  to	  the	  common	  experience	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  US	  of	  the	  correlated	  excessive	  expansion	  of	  mortgage	  debt	  and	  house	  prices.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The US bubble peaked somewhat earlier in mid-2006 in the US but prices remained elevated through 2007 
(Levitin and Wachter 2012).	  	  	  
2 Global savings glut would seem to support the synchronous expansion across countries as well as the decline in 
interest rates.  However, interest rates rose in 2004 as the bubble continued to expand.  The global savings glut 
explanation cannot be the sole factor since many countries, such as Japan and Germany did not in fact experience 
price increases.  The literature on the GSG is mixed with several studies discounting its strength as an explanation 
(Favilukis et al. 2012). 
3 We argue elsewhere that the mispricing of subprime mortgage debt was a key factor, along with poor underwriting 
and the inelastic supply of real estate (Pavlov and Wachter 2011).	  	  	  
4 See for example Foote et al. (2012) which points to the role of CDOs.  
5 “[E]ven is they earn substandard returns, they are likely to be able to borrow against their capital gains so long as 
lenders rely on market prices above the fundamental price when determining the value of real estate as collateral” 
(Herring and Wachter 1999, p.5). 
6 Or homebuyers may simply purchase as they can afford or as the prevailing credit conditions allow.   
7 See Goodman 2013 for discussion of the STACR and C-Deals instruments.  For additional information refer to the 
following web links: 
Freddie Mac Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR®), 
http://www.freddiemac.com/creditriskofferings/stacr_debt.html;  
Connecticut Avenue Securities (C-deals), 
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/funding-the-market/credit-risk/conn-ave.html.	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FIGURE 1: House Prices Adjusted for Inflation	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